Yearly Archives: 2011

Local Traditions in Gorillas

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Interesting study published in Animal Cognition describing the apparenty development of local traditions in gorillas. From the article abstract,

Elaborate manual skills of food processing are known in several species of great ape; but their manner of acquisition is controversial. Local, “cultural” traditions show the influence of social learning, but it is uncertain whether this includes the ability to imitate the organization of behavior. Dispute has centered on whether program-level imitation contributes to the acquisition of feeding techniques in gorillas. Here, we show that captive western gorillas at Port Lympne, Kent, have developed a group-wide habit of feeding on nettles, using two techniques. We compare their nettle processing behavior with that of wild mountain gorillas in Rwanda. Both populations are similar in their repertoires of action elements, and in developing multi-step techniques for food processing, with coordinated asymmetric actions of the hands and iteration of parts of a process as “subroutines”. Crucially, however, the two populations deal in different ways with the special challenges presented by nettle stings, with consistently different organizations of action elements. We conclude that, while an elaborate repertoire of manual actions and the ability to develop complex manual skills are natural characteristics of gorillas, the inter-site differences in nettle-eating technique are best explained as a consequence of social transmission. According to this explanation, gorillas can copy aspects of program organization from the behavior of others and they use this ability when learning how to eat nettles, resulting in consistent styles of processing by most individuals at each different site; like other great apes, gorillas have the precursor abilities for developing culture.

An article in New Scientist about the study says this is the first time evidence of local traditions in gorillas has been found, although such behavior has been documented in other great ape species.

Eurojust and Europol Hold Joint Conference on Animal Rights Extremism

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In July, Europol, the European Union’s official criminal intelligence agency, and Eurojust, an EU agency dealing with cooperation in cross-border investigations, held a joint conference at The Hague to discuss “the phenomenon of increased violence committed by some extremists in the name of animal rights.”

The two organizations issued a joint press released afterward saying,

The phenomenon of increased violence committed by some extremists in the name of animal rights is a growing cause for concern. In a major conference organised by Europol and Eurojust 58 experts from law enforcement and prosecution authorities, plus representatives from 35 private sector organisations, met last week at Europol’s new headquarters in The Hague to discuss the issues behind this new trend.While the defence of the rights of animals and their welfare is legitimate and fully supported by European Union institutions, the increase in violence by extremists remains a concern for all of the conference participants. An example is the increased use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Improvised Incendiary Devices (IIDs).

Violent animal rights extremists do not hesitate in sending threatening emails or making warning phone calls to their targets, often intimidating their family and committing physical assaults on their property, in so-called home visits. This has resulted in arson attacks on cars and property. Single-issue extremist groups are also actively targeting the fur and pharmaceutical industries. This has included the mass release of animals and the destruction of feeding and water installations for the animals. Another tendency is that single-issue extremist groups (including anarchist groups) are supporting each others’ causes more and more.

“We are concerned by the increasing levels of violence used by animal rights extremists and their tendency to collaborate with other extremists in society.  Europol is committed to helping law enforcement authorities in the EU and partners in industry to prevent the further spread of this activity. The conference at Europol’s new headquarters was an important milestone in these efforts.” says Rob Wainwright, Director of Europol.

Together with a tactical meeting held at Eurojust in April 2011 on the same topic, the conference clearly identified the need for a wider exchange of information to provide the Member States’ authorities with a clear picture of ongoing criminal activities. There is a tendency to underestimate the importance of the phenomenon and of the links between criminal actions committed in different countries. Forensic analysis clearly demonstrates that some attacks committed in the EU have used the same modus operandi and that the devices used are similarly manufactured.

From the context of the conference, it became obvious that the violent criminal activities are often orchestrated at an international level. To this end, a need for increased law enforcement coordination at an international level was identified, as well as more awareness on a local police and judicial level.

The conference recommendations include:

  • Encouraging Member States’ authorities to prevent and fight all forms of violent criminal extremism and developing, at an EU level, a renewed dialogue on animal protection and animal welfare to allow all concerned parties to express their needs and concerns in a democratic way
  • Exploring the possibility of sharing technical data with the relevant parts of the corporate security community and their branch organisations, respecting the data protection regulations within Europol and Eurojust’s existing legal frameworks
  • Developing a common strategy with the corporate security community to further cooperation between EU institutions and the relevant parts of the private sector.

The above recommendations were supported by a conclusion that called for increased information exchange with Europol and Eurojust on attacks, prosecutions and convictions in animal rights extremism cases. This will lead to the identification of good practice, increased sharing of experience and ultimately a more efficient and coordinated approach in tackling the phenomenon.

Europol and Eurojust are currently supporting ongoing enquiries in a number of Member States that are linked to crimes committed in the name of animal welfare.

 

How Zoos Satisfy Predatory Animals' Hunting Instincts

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Natalie Wolchover wrote a fascinating piece for LiveScience.com on how zoos attempt to satisfy the predatory instincts of animals they keep.

Wolchover talks to Smithsonian National Zoo public affairs assistant Jennifer Zoon who says that while predatory animals the zoo keeps are fed a diet comparable to what they would get in the wild, actual hunting by animals has to be simulated. Oddly enough, the primary concern about allowing any sort of live predation (such a releasing a live rabbit in a tiger enclosure) is potential harm to the predator,

As Andrew Circo of the San Diego Zoo told the British newspaper the Guardian in 2008, “We do not feed live animals for a very important reason. Sometimes those animals fight back and, in exercising their instincts, may injure one of our endangered … animals. And when dealing with many endangered species, you do not want to take a chance that an injury could lead to other health complications. Not even our snakes get live mice.

Zoos apparently try to satisfy the predatory urges of such animals mostly by simulating live animals with cardboard dummies, large balls and similar object to simulate prey, and in some cases causing the dead carcass of an animal intended for feeding to move to give the predator animal the illusion that it still needs to kill its food.

If It Becomes Possible, Should Human Beings End Predation?

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One of the more interesting dilemmas that animal rights critiques poses is exactly what role human beings should play as part of the animal kingdom, specifically when it comes to things like predation. After all, if we suppose that birds have rights, not only does the turkey on a farm have a right not to become my Thanksgiving meal, then so does the bird chirping outside my window have a right not to become the victim of the neighborhood serial killer of the feline persuasion.

Occasionally a variety of this argument is used as an attempted reductio ad absurdum against the case for animal rights — that if one were to take seriously the claims made by animal rights theorists that humans should be out there attempting to prevent lions from preying on zebras and antelope. Taking that to a further extreme, perhaps instead of attempting to preserve endangered carnivore species, human beings should instead allow them to go extinct since this would reduce the total suffering in the world on this view.

Some people, especially in the transhumanist community, take this idea very seriously, however. In September, The New York Times published an op-ed by Rutgers University philosophy professor Jeff McMahan on this very topic. Once you get past the tedious introduction referencing Isaiah and whether or not we would be “playing God” by making wholesale changes in carnivorous species, McMahan gets to the heart of the matter,

There is an element of truth in this view, which is that our moral reason to prevent harm for which we would not be responsible is weaker than our reason not to cause harm.  Our primary duty with respect to animals is therefore to stop tormenting and killing them as a means of satisfying our desire to taste certain flavors or to decorate our bodies in certain ways.  But if suffering is bad for animals when we cause it, it is also bad for them when other animals cause it.  That suffering is bad for those who experience it is not a human prejudice; nor is an effort to prevent wild animals from suffering a moralistic attempt to police the behavior of other animals.  Even if we are not morally required to prevent suffering among animals in the wild for which we are not responsible, we do have a moral reason to prevent it, just as we have a general moral reason to prevent suffering among human beings that is independent both of the cause of the suffering and of our relation to the victims.  The main constraint on the permissibility of acting on our reason to prevent suffering is that our action should not cause bad effects that would be worse than those we could prevent.

That is the central issue raised by whether we ought to try to eliminate carnivorism.  Because the elimination of carnivorism would require the extinction of carnivorous species, or at least their radical genetic alteration, which might be equivalent or tantamount to extinction, it might well be that the losses in value would outweigh any putative gains.  Not only are most or all animal species of some instrumental value, but it is also arguable that all species have intrinsic value.  As Ronald Dworkin has observed, “we tend to treat distinct animal species (though not individual animals) as sacred.  We think it very important, and worth a considerable economic expense, to protect endangered species from destruction.”  When Dworkin says that animal species are sacred, he means that their existence is good in a way that need not be good for anyone; nor is it good in the sense that it would be better if there were more species, so that we would have reason to create new ones if we could.  “Few people,” he notes, “believe the world would be worse if there had always been fewer species of birds, and few would think it important to engineer new bird species if that were possible.  What we believe important is not that there be any particular number of species but that a species that now exists not be extinguished by us.”

. . .

Yet the extinction of an animal species is not necessarily bad for its individual members.  (To indulge in science fiction, suppose that a chemical might be introduced into their food supply that would induce sterility but also extend their longevity.)  And the extinction of a carnivorous species could be instrumentally good for all those animals that would otherwise have been its prey.  That simple fact is precisely what prompts the question whether it would be good if carnivorous species were to become extinct.

. . .

Here, then, is where matters stand thus far.  It would be good to prevent the vast suffering and countless violent deaths caused by predation.  There is therefore one reason to think that it would be instrumentally good if  predatory animal species were to become extinct and be replaced by new herbivorous species, provided that this could occur without ecological upheaval involving more harm than would be prevented by the end of predation.  The claim that existing animal species are sacred or irreplaceable is subverted by the moral irrelevance of the criteria for individuating animal species.  I am therefore inclined to embrace the heretical conclusion that we have reason to desire the extinction of all carnivorous species, and I await the usual fate of heretics when this article is opened to comment.

Transhumanists who go down this road typically posit altering the DNA of carnivores and omnivores so that they no longer need/desire the flesh of other animals (which McMahan does mention), or producing meat  in a non-cruel way (for example, growing it in a vat and then distributing it somehow).

An alternative that McMahan seems to ignore might be modifying prey species so that they no longer suffer when they are killed by predators which would allow predation to continue without reducing the number of species or radically changing the ecosystem in other ways.

It is also curious that McMahan and others tend to stop there. After all, predation is not the only cause of suffering in the animal kingdom. For example, in 2009 a 39-year-old chimpanzee kept in captivity at a zoo in Oregon died from what is believed to have been either a heart attack or stroke. Presumably, either way the chimpanzee’s death involved quite a bit of suffering.

Would human beings also be obliged to then re-engineer animals to prevent the sort of suffering that occurs even from “natural” deaths? If we are somehow obliged to prevent suffering due to predation, it becomes difficult to argue that we can still tolerate other forms of suffering that animals experience.